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This paper presents the results of a task to analyze
the operating experience data for large, pulsed power
supplies used at the DIII-D tokamak. This activity
supports the International Thermonuclear Experimental
Reactor (ITER) project by giving fusion-specific
reliability values for large power supplies that energize
neutral beams and magnets. These failure rate data are
necessary to perform system availability calculations and
to make estimates of the frequency of safety-significant
events (e.g., power supply arcs or fires) that might occur
in other fusion facilities such as ITER. The analysis shows
that the DIII-D data results compare well with the results
of similar data analysis work that the Italian National
Agency for New Technologies, Energy and the
Environment (ENEA) has performed on the JET tokamak
and compare fairly with data from two accelerators.
I. INTRODUCTION
The International Energy Agency (IEA), based in
Brussels, sponsors collaboration on the environmental,
safety, and economic aspects of magnetic fusion. One of
the tasks (Task 5) within that collaboration is
development of a fusion component failure rate database.
The Task 5 component failure rate data are to be used to
quantify probabilistic safety assessment, support
traditional safety analysis, quantify reliability,
availability, maintainability, and inspectability (RAMI)
analyses, and support any other uses where field
experience can provide feedback to fusion facilities.
Task 5 began in 1989 and has had two parts. The first part
of the task was to “harvest” already-published data from
high-technology industries that can be readily applied to
fusion components.
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The second part of Task 5 is to
collect and analyze operating experience data from
existing tokamaks and other fusion experiments. The data
harvesting task initially populated a computerized
database developed at ENEA-Frascati.
2,3
The ongoing
operating experience data analysis is providing further
information to the database.
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This information is used in
safety assessment for upcoming fusion experiments.
Data collection and analysis from one tokamak
requires verification to prove that the data are
representative of other machine operating experiences. By
agreement among Task 5 participants, component failure
rate data values require some level of validation for entry
into the database. Generally, validation is done by
comparing two independent data values; good data
compare within a factor of 3, fair data within a factor of
10, and poor data compare at larger than a factor of 10
(Ref. 1). Good, and to a lesser extent fair, comparisons
demonstrate that the component failure rates are
representative of tokamaks in general and are not the
result of some unique, site-specific issue.
Developing a second, independent data set for
validation comparison is difficult. Task participants have
endeavored to develop data sets that are complimentary
for the purpose of validation, and have developed a plan
where data from similar systems of similar tokamaks are
analyzed. The power supply data presented here are the
result of a task to generate an independent data set from
DIII-D operating experiences and compare it to similar
work that has been completed on operating experiences
from the JET Joint Undertaking.
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Power supplies were chosen for analysis because
these are important support system components in any
tokamak. While ITER is a first-of-a-kind experiment,
predecessor tokamaks and the equipment used at those
tokamaks provide a good indication of the reliability and
operational availability of future experiments. Some of
the power supplies presently in use, for example the
neutral beam (NB) power supplies, are directly similar to
those to be used on next-generation machines such as
ITER, so the operating experience of these units is
directly important to ITER safety and availability.
This analysis includes all power supplies. Some of
the DIII-D and JET power supplies are quite large, such
as those that supply power to the resistive magnetic field
coils, and will not be used in ITER. However, the
amounts of electrical energy that these pulsed power
supplies deliver make them relevant to other ITER uses
and to uses at other tokamaks. Therefore, including all
power supplies in the data analysis broadened the data set
and provided completeness to the analysis.
II. DIII-D OPERATING EXPERIENCE DATA
The DIII-D experiment, located in California,
operates in pulsed mode, with usually 5 seconds of pulse
operating time followed by a shutdown lasting 10-15
minutes while pulse data are saved, components are
cooled, and the machine is prepared for another plasma
pulse.
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Therefore, power supplies are “on duty” for
entire operating days with down times for cooldown after
each pulse. The main DIII-D power supply parameters are
given in Table I (Refs. 10 and 11). The installation dates
show that most power supplies were installed for use on
the Doublet III machine. Given that the early lifetime of
such power supplies is on the order of 4 years,
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the
DIII-D units are considered to be mature components that
were commissioned for use on the DIII-D beginning in
1987.
Over 1,700 trouble reports on power supplies were
downloaded from the DIII-D Trouble Report Database
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for analysis. These reports were categorized by their
power supply identifier and by the faulted subcomponent
in the database. The reports were then tabulated by the
subcomponent’s failure mode to allow component failure
rate calculations. The data results are given in Tables II
and III (Ref. 13).
The US data analysis used several failure modes,
which had to be summed and equated to the JET failure
modes to allow comparison. Failure to operate (the power
supply does not operate when needed), failure to continue
to run (the power supply fired but did not complete the
shot), and degraded operation (the power supply did not
deliver rated outputs or operated spuriously) were
summed and equated to the JET data category of ‘fail to
operate/spurious operation’. The DIII-D failure modes of
fail to preset, alarm condition, and erratic alarm were
summed and equated to the JET category of ‘alarm/erratic
alarm/fail to preset’. The DIII-D failure rates for all
failure modes were summed and equated to the JET
category of ‘generic trouble’. Power supply failure rates
given are per hour of operating day. The DIII-D operating
hours used in the analysis were those reported in annual
operations reports. In some years at DIII-D the neutral
beam injectors were used continuously, and other years
they were used only 70% of the time, for an average
usage of 90%. This value was applied to the overall
machine operating time.
TABLE I. DIII-D Power Supply Information
Power Supply Parameters
Power Supply Identifier Load Supplied
a
Voltage
(kV)
Amperage
(kA) Year Installed
B TF magnet coils 1 130 1976
E Ohmic heating magnet coils 0.6 300 1976
X Copper—20 units PF magnet coils 0.48 3 1979
HX Chopper—16 units PF magnet coils 0.96 3 1979
HV1 HX choppers for PF magnets 1.2 20 1981
HV2 HX choppers for PF magnets 1.2 20 1984
D1 X choppers for PF magnets 0.6 10 1977
D2 X choppers for PF magnets 0.6 14 1984
T1, T2 X choppers for PF magnets 0.6 6 1982
V1 X choppers for PF magnets 0.52 14 1977
NB NB magnet power 0.08 0.6 1978
NB Filament Power Supply NB ion source filament 5.5 0.02 1978
NB Arc Power Supply NB arc 0.07 3 1978
UCV7 NB HV power to accelerator 80 0.1 1982
UCV5 NB HV power to accelerator 80 0.1 1982
a. TF = toroidal field, PF = poloidal field, NB = neutral beam, HV = high voltage.
Note: All of these power supplies were installed before the inception of the DIII-D Trouble Report Database in May 1987.
All units are considered to be mature components. Some units have been swapped to other locations, overhauled, or
repaired in the course of DIII-D operations.
TABLE II. Overall Failure Rates for DIII-D Coil Power Supplies, 1987-2004
Power Supply System
Number of
Faults in
Trouble Reports
System Run Time
(hr)
Failure Rate
(/hr)
±Standard
Error
B Power Supply, TF Coil Power Supply System—
All Modes or Generic Trouble
289 13,150 2.2E–01 4.1E–03
B Power Supply, TF Coil Power Supply System—
Alarm/Erratic Alarm/Fail to Preset
31 13,150 2.4E–03 4.3E–04
B Power Supply, TF Coil Power Supply System—
Fail to Operate and Spurious Operation
258 13,150 2.0E–02 1.2E–03
E Power Supply, Ohmic Coil Power Supply
System—All Modes or Generic Trouble
212 13,150 1.6E–02 1.1E–03
E Power Supply, Ohmic Coil Power Supply
System—Alarm/Erratic Alarm/Fail to Preset
32 13,150 2.4E–03 4.3E–04
E Power Supply, Ohmic Coil Power Supply
System—Fail to Operate and Spurious Operation
180 13,150 1.4E–02 1.0E–03
PF Power Supply Set, Coil Power Supply System—
All Modes or Generic Trouble
921 13,150 7.0E–02 2.3E–03
PF Power Supply Set, Coil Power Supply System—
Alarm/Erratic Alarm/Fail to Preset
118 13,150 9.0E–03 8.3E–04
PF Power Supply Set, Coil Power Supply System—
Fail to Operate and Spurious Operation
803 13,150 6.1E–02 2.2E–03
DIII-D All Coil Power Supply Systems—All Modes
or Generic Trouble
1,422 13,150 1.1E–01 2.9E–03
DIII-D All Coil Power Supply Systems—
Alarm/Erratic Alarm/Fail to Preset
181 13,150 1.4E–02 1.0E–03
DIII-D All Coil Power Supply Systems—Fail to
Operate and Spurious Operation
1,241 13,150 9.4E–02 2.7E–03
Note: The DIII-D experiment operates on an 8.5-hour shift in a typical pulse day. DIII-D completed 44,417 pulses from
1987 to 2004.
TABLE III. Overall Failure Rates for DIII-D NB Power Supplies, 1987–2004
Power Supply System
Number of
Faults in
Trouble Reports
System Run Time
(hr)
Failure Rate
(/hr)
±Standard
Error
DIII-D All NB Power Supply Systems—All Modes
or Generic Trouble
32 11,835 2.7E–03 4.8E–04
DIII-D All NB Power Supply Systems—
Alarm/Erratic Alarm/Fail to Preset
2 11,835 1.7E–04 1.2E–04
DIII-D All NB Power Supply Systems—Fail to
Operate and Spurious Operation
30 11,835 2.5E–03 4.6E–04
From Tables II and III, one can see that the coil
power supplies had many trouble reports filed on fault
events, and consequently the failure rates were high. The
NB power supplies are, in general, more modest units
with lower amperage. These units had very few trouble
reports and very low failure rates, which is reasonable
since the units are well designed and not pushed as hard
in DIII-D operations compared to their design parameters.
The overall collection of power supply trouble report
data also held a few important citations of serious failures.
Over the collection time period, there were 20 events of
smoke, 1 cited fire event, 15 electrical arc events, 5
electrical equipment explosions, 4 events of sparks issued
from power supplies, and 18 events of components such
as circuit boards and diodes being electrically
overstressed and “blowing up.” (The electronic parts
blowing up are not as severe or energetic as the
explosions.) Thus, 21 smoke/fire events in 13,150 total
operating hours (at  750 operating hours/year) gives 1
smoke/fire event per year. The electrical arc events give
0.86 events per operating year, another plant operational
event. The five electrical explosions and four spark events
give frequencies of 0.3/year and 0.2/year, respectively.
Using the ITER frequency definitions, these frequencies
would be in the plant operational events frequency
category. The DIII-D safety provision of making
exclusion areas around the electrical equipment while it is
energized is a prudent safety precaution and a best
practice for ITER design.
III. JET JOINT UNDERTAKING OPERATING
EXPERIENCE DATA ANALYSIS
The component failure rate data approach taken with
JET in the UK was more robust than the U.S. approach.
The researchers reviewed plant-specific historical records,
including operation records (e.g., electronic records and
hand-written logbooks), failure investigation reports,
maintenance and repair records, and the annual operations
and technical reports on JET operations. They also
conducted plant personnel interviews.
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These more
detailed data have supported the analysis very well.
Like the DIII-D experiment, JET operates in a pulsed
mode. Pulses can be produced at a typical rate of about 22
pulses in 16 hours, and each pulse can last for up to 60
seconds in duration. During a JET pulse, the main power
demands are the toroidal field coils, the poloidal
transformer coils, the plasma equilibrium coils, and the
divertor coils. They require a total amount of energy of
nearly 10,000 MJ, and a peak power of over 1,000 MW
for the pulse time. Like most tokamaks, a motor-generator
flywheel system is used to supplement the power taken
from the electrical utility power grid.
There are some differences between JET and DIII-D.
JET is a larger machine and operates at different voltages.
The national power grid for JET operates at 400 kV and is
stepped down to 36 kV for distribution in the JET facility.
The JET toroidal field coils have a maximum of 67 kA
and 5.8 kV. A JET operating day was taken to be 16 hours
rather than the 8.5 hours at DIII-D. The JET system-level
failure rate data per operating hour are given in Table IV
(Refs. 5 and 6).
IV. DATA COMPARISON
The data in Tables II, III, and IV show several
differences. First, the DIII-D data set spans from 1987 to
2004 versus the JET data time frame of 1997–2003. Even
with the longer time frame, the DIII-D machine ran for
less overall hours than JET. This discrepancy of operating
times is not believed to be caused by reliability issues, but
rather a factor of available funds for operations—namely
the high cost of electric power (which can be over 4% of
total tokamak operations costs) and the cost of
consumable items such as cryogen and compressed gases.
The next difference is the number of reported faults
in each of the categories for the overall coil systems. JET
reported less overall faults than DIII-D. Initially this
deviation was believed to be due to the fact that the
DIII-D power supplies are older than the JET
equipment—JET began operation in 1983 while many of
TABLE IV. Coil and NB power supply failure rates for troubles occurring during JET operating days, 1997–2003
Power Supply System
Number of
Faults Recorded
System Run Time
(hr)
Failure Rate
(/hr)
±Standard
Error
Coil Power Supply Systems—Generic Trouble 990 14,864 6.7E–02 2.1E–03
Coil Power Supply Systems—Alarm/Erratic Alarm/
Fail to Preset
534 14,864 3.6E–02 1.6E–03
Coil Power Supply Systems—Fail to Operate/
Spurious Operation
456 14,864 3.1E–02 1.4E–03
NB Power Supply Systems—Generic Trouble 870 13,456 6.5E–02 2.2E–03
NB Power Supply Systems—Alarm/Erratic Alarm/
Fail to Preset
627 13,456 4.7E–02 1.9E–03
NB Power Supply Systems—Fail to Operate/
Spurious Operation
243 13,456 1.8E–02 1.2E–03
the DIII-D power supplies were installed in the 1970s, as
shown in Table I. However, as part of the analysis,
trouble reports per calendar year were plotted.
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Those
plots showed no notable increases in trouble reporting in
later years and no discernable trend of equipment end-of-
life “wearout” failures at DIII-D. Therefore, component
age should not be a factor in failure rate variances. Rather,
different reporting criteria at the facilities may be the
primary reason for this discrepancy.
The next variance between the tables is that JET
reported more alarm/erratic alarm/fail to preset events
than DIII-D. There could be several reasons for this
deviation, but the primary reason is believed to be that the
JET data carried more detail, with logbooks and personnel
interviews, and such detail yielded more data regarding
alarms. It is also possible that some of the DIII-D trouble
report data may have been miscategorized during the data
analysis. Counts might compare more favorably if more
DIII-D data could be analyzed in a process of site visits
similar to those that researchers conducted at JET. The
JET data revealed that about 55% of all JET coil power
supply faults were in the alarm category and 45% were in
the failure to operate/spurious operation category. The
DIII-D data were 13% and 87% in these respective
categories. Comparing the two values of highest
importance (i.e., the rates of power supplies failing to
operate), gives 9.4E–02/hr for DIII-D and 3.1E–02/hr for
JET. These two values show a factor of 3 difference,
which is a good comparison of failure rates. For the
alarm failure mode, DIII-D had a rate of 1.4E–02/hr and
the JET rate was 3.6E–02/hr, which are within a factor of
three of each other, another good comparison.
Comparing the JET and DIII-D NB data, the NB
power supply information from DIII-D was much sparser
than the data from JET. The DIII-D NB power supply fail
to operate rate was 2.5E–03/hr and the JET rate was
1.8E–02/hr, which is over a factor of 7 difference. That is
a fair comparison. The DIII-D data did not carry nearly
the number of trouble reports expected for these power
supplies. The small number of reports is believed to be
due to these power supplies not having the high-energy
output of the main magnet coil units. The DIII-D NB
power supplies appear to be modest output units
exhibiting high reliability. The NB power supplies deliver
a few MW per pulse while the main power supplies for
magnet coils deliver hundreds of MW per pulse. The
main coil power supplies have perhaps a thousand silicon
controlled rectifiers in their systems, whereas the NB
power supplies have two vacuum tubes. Another issue is
that the NB systems have had other, more troublesome
components (e.g., ion sources) whose faults resulted in
NB downtime which subsequently resulted in reductions
to NB power supply duty factors. However, the
discrepancy in the failure rates, particularly after
receiving good comparisons of coil power supply failure
rates, suggests that perhaps some DIII-D NB power
supply troubles were dealt with immediately and did not
reach the database for assignment to a system engineer. It
is also possible that some NB trouble reports were
categorized into other systems rather than power systems.
V. OTHER POWER SUPPLY DATA
Some reliability data were found in the literature
about magnet power supplies at particle accelerators. The
Advanced Photon Source uses  1,400 power supplies
that drive resistive magnets on its storage ring. These
power supplies generate between 60 and 450 A direct
current at 1,000 to 1,700 V to power the magnets, and
operate on the order of 5,000 hr/year. If one power supply
is lost, the beam storage is lost, so reliability is an
important issue at the facility. Hillman
14
gave information
on the power supply mean time between failures (MTBF)
that resulted in beam loss. Over four calendar years, the
power supply MTBF was 118.95, 89.96, 86.36, and
142.84 hours. Failure rates are the reciprocal of the
MTBF, so the failure rates are 8.4E–03/hr, 1.1E–02/hr,
1.2E–02/hr, and 7E–03/hr, or an average of 9.1E–03/hr.
Therefore, these independent data give power supply
“failure to operate” failure rates on the order of 1E–02 to
9E–03/hr. The JET data compare well to these particle
accelerator data, and the DIII-D data compare fairly. This
comparison is particularly important since fusion power
supplies operate with more on/off pulses than accelerator
power supplies.
The DANE accelerator power supplies are rated
from 10 to 3,000 A and 6 to 1,250 V dc. This facility
reported power supply failures over 5 years, with results
on the order of 4.47 faults per two week (336 h) run
times, or 1.3E–02/hr as an overall failure rate.
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This is a
good to fair comparison for both DIII-D and JET data.
As the data show, these independent data sets also
yield power supply failure rates that confirm the values
calculated from DIII-D and JET data.
VI. CONCLUSIONS
These data analyses show that the results coming
from tokamak trouble report databases can be accurate in
comparison to each other and to data sets generated at
other high-technology facilities. The data results confirm
each other and can be used to support ITER systems
availability analysis and also studies of facility safety.
The data on catastrophic failures of power supplies will
be used in worker safety studies to provide safety zones
and barriers to prevent additional equipment damage.
These data results are useful to ITER and other tokamaks.
The IEA task is ongoing; the next systems under analysis
are plasma heating systems, another function that is
essential to tokamak operations.
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